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Introduction	
Motivated	by	concerns	for	clean,	secure	energy	and	economic	growth,	many	
governments	around	the	world	are	increasingly	trying	to	develop	domestic	energy	
sources	within	their	own	territories.	Among	others,	renewable	energy	and	
unconventional	fossil	fuels	are	two	key	resource	categories	that	are	high	on	political	
agendas.	Though	perhaps	pointing	towards	different	energy	futures,	efforts	to	develop	
these	industries	have	led	to	significant	levels	of	public	resistance	in	many	countries.	In	
Britain,	the	anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	movements	have	been	the	two	most	
notable	manifestations	of	such	resistance.		 	
The	anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	movements	are	direct	responses	to	
different	aspects	of	UK	government	energy	policy.	Emerging	some	twenty	years	apart,	
each	has	given	rise	to	significant	levels	of	grassroots	mobilisation	and	a	number	of	
nationally	focused	organisations,	and	each	has	involved	concerted	efforts	to	resist	the	
development	of	energy	infrastructure.	Notably,	the	potential	of	such	opposition	to	
impact	on	the	implementation	of	energy	policy	has	stimulated	initiatives	among	elite	
political	and	economic	actors	to	improve	levels	of	public	acceptance	of	developments	
and	thus	improve	policy	outcomes.		
In	order	to	provide	a	comparative	analysis	of	the	anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	
movements	against	the	backdrop	of	renewable	and	unconventional	energy	policy	in	the	
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UK,	we	begin	with	a	brief	overview	of	the	context	and	character	of	both	movements,	
and	seek	to	explain	their	predominantly	grassroots	character.	The	focus	then	shifts	to	an	
analysis	of	similarities	and	difference	in	terms	of	grievances,	alliances	and	tactics.	
Finally,	we	consider	the	consequences	of	both	movements	and	responses	by	elite	
political	and	economic	actors	to	secure	policy	outcomes	in	the	context	of	public	
opposition.	
	
Context,	mobilisation,	opportunities		
The	emergence	of	anti-wind	farm	activism	in	Britain	began	in	the	early-1990s	in	
response	to	a	tentative	government	push	towards	developing	renewable	energy	under	
the	Non-Fossil	Fuel	Obligation	(NFFO).	Instituted	in	1990,	the	NFFO	was	primarily	a	
means	of	subsidising	nuclear	energy	(Mitchell	and	Connor	2004),	but	a	small	percentage	
of	available	funds	(e.g.	5%	from	1990-94)	was	allocated	to	support	renewables	(Douglas	
and	Saluja	1995:	702).	Involving	a	competitive	bidding	process	for	contracts	among	
developers,	the	NFFO	stimulated	the	growth	of	a	modest	wind	energy	sector,	which	saw	
some	46	operational	windfarms	across	the	UK	by	the	end	of	the	decade	(Danby	and	
Gore	1999).	However,	precisely	because	this	growth	was	limited,	the	NFFO	came	under	
increasing	criticism	(Mitchell	and	Connor	2004:	1937)	and	the	incumbent	Labour	
administration	in	2002	replaced	it	with	the	Renewables	Obligation	(RO),	a	market	
based-instrument	that	required	electricity	suppliers	to	purchase	increasing	percentages	
of	renewable	electricity	from	renewable	energy	developers.	Under	the	RO,	“applications	
for	planning	permission…soared”	(Mitchell	and	Connor	2004:	1939)	and	wind	energy	
deployment	substantially	increased,	from	552MW	in	2002	to	just	over	10,000MWs	by	
early-2014	(GWEC	2012;	RenewableUK	2014b).		
In	the	1990s,	in	response	to	the	increasing	development	of	windfarms	across	the	
country,	an	anti-windfarm	movement	-	primarily	grassroots	and	constituted	by	
numerous	local	campaign	groups	fighting	against	(proposed)	wind	energy	developments	
–	emerged	and	began	to	gain	support.	The	first	of	these	groups	formed	in	the	early	
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1990s	(Elliott	2003:	chapter	12)	and,	as	the	Renewables	Obligation	took	effect	at	the	
beginning	of	the	new	century,	they	multiplied	in	number.	Over	the	last	25	years,	an	
estimated	300	such	organisations	came	into	being	(Country	Guardian	2015b),	although	
groups	would	come	and	go	in	the	course	of	time.	In	addition	to	grassroots	mobilisation,	
the		movement	has	also	included	groups	concerned	with	research,	lobbying	national	
government,	and	supporting	local	campaigns	(Szarka	and	Blühdorn	2006:	31).		
The	most	significant	of	these,	the	Country	Guardian,	began	in	1990	as	a	local	campaign	
group	in	Cumbria,	but	developed	into	an	umbrella	organisation	that	“acts	as	a	clearing	
house	for	information	and	advice,	servicing…[local]	action	groups”	(Country	Guardian	
2015a).	Given	this	role,	the	Country	Guardian	became	the	central	connecting	node	of	
the	movement	and		additionally	serves	to	provide	local	groups	with	a	sense	of	collective	
identity.	Other	national	organisations	include	single	issue	groups	(e.g.	the	Windfarm	
Action	Group,	Artists	Against	Windfarms,	and	Scotland	Against	Spin)	and	the	Renewable	
Energy	Foundation	(REF),	which	expanded	its	initial	remit	beyond	wind	energy	“to	
promote	renewables	–	albeit	over	and	against	wind	power”	(Szarka	and	Blühdorn	2006:	
31).		
The	issue	of	fracking	in	Britain	emerged	some	20	years	later	than	wind	power,	and	arose	
in	the	context	of	the	UK	coalition	government’s	push,	from	2010,	to	develop	shale	gas	
and	other	unconventional	sources	of	energy,	including	shale	oil	and	coal	bed	methane.	
Buoyed	by	the	success	of	the	shale	gas	and	oil	industries	in	the	US	and	recent	estimates	
of	significant	onshore	reserves	in	the	UK	(e.g.	BGS	2013;	BGS	2014),	and	believing	that	
the	exploitation	of	unconventional	energy	will	contribute	to	energy	security	and	
economic	growth,	the	UK	government	has	attempted	to	stimulate	investment	in	the	
exploration	and	development	of	these	resources,	by	instituting	a	generous	tax	regime.
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In	recent	years,	industry	interest	in	searching	for	unconventional	fossil	fuels	has	grown,	
and	numerous	planning	applications	have	been	submitted.	However,	public	concern	
about	the	possible	unintended	consequences	of	onshore	fossil	fuel	extraction,	has	given	
rise	to	concerted	efforts	to	resist	these	developments,	particularly	where	they	involve	
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fracking,	a	technology	used	to	extract	‘unconventional’	forms	of	oil	and	gas.
2
	
The	anti-fracking	movement	emerged	in	the	spring	of	2011	after	fracking	at	Cuadrilla	
Resources’	Preese	Hall	1	well	near	Blackpool	led	to	minor	earthquakes	in	the	area.	In	
spite	of	an	18-month	nationwide	moratorium	on	fracking	as	a	direct	result	of	these	
earth	tremors,	interest	in	exploratory	drilling	stimulated	the	emergence	of	Britain’s	first	
local	anti-fracking	groups,	including	several	local	groups	around	the	Blackpool	area.	
Most	probably	as	a	result	of	the	moratorium,	the	growth	of	local	groups	was	initially	
modest,	reaching	around	40	by	mid-2013.	Yet	from	this	point	on,	the	number	increased	
rapidly,	according	to	one	source	by	about	10	per	month	(Vidal	2014).	By	the	spring	of	
2015,	the	number	of	local	anti-fracking	groups	had	exceeded	200.	
In	addition	to	local	campaign	groups,	the	anti-fracking	movement	includes	a	number	of	
national	organisations.	The	most	prominent	of	these	is	Frack	Off,	a	Brighton-based	
group	that	provides	information,	advice	and	support	to	community	campaigners	and	
others	on	‘extreme	energy’	and	related	issues
3
.	In	this	role	it	serves	a	similar	function	in	
relation	to	fracking	as	does	the	Country	Guardian	with	windpower,	not	least	in	being	a	
central	node	connecting	different	local	groups	and	reinforcing	a	sense	of	collective	
identity.	Other	notable	national	organisations	in	the	movement	include	Talk	Fracking,	
which	seeks	“to	provide	a	forum	for	debate…so	that	an	informed	public	can	decide	for	
themselves	whether	they	support	fracking”	(Talk	Fracking	2015),	and	Mothers	Against	
Fracking,	a	network	of	mothers	“concerned	about	the	dangers	unconventional	oil	and	
gas	will	have	on	their	children’s	health	and	the	planet	in	the	future”	(Mothers	Against	
Fracking	2015).		
As	can	be	seen	from	these	brief	overviews,	both	the	anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	
movements	represent	direct	responses	to	different	government	energy	policies	
involving	distinct	technologies,	which,	though	initially	implemented	some	twenty	years	
apart,	continue	to	make	an	impact.	However,	in	spite	of	these	differences,	the	two	
movements	are	structurally	similar,	not	least	in	terms	of	the	hundreds	of	community	
campaign	groups	that	constitute	them.	How	can	we	explain	this	shared	characteristic	in	
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light	of	the	other	apparent	differences	between	them?		
Though	generating	electricity	from	wind	power	and	fracking	for	unconventional	energy	
are	very	different	processes,	both	types	of	energy	development	involve	the	deployment	
of	geographically	diffuse	infrastructure	to	exploit	geographically	diffuse	resources.
4
		
Unlike	other	types	of	energy	infrastructure	(e.g.	coal	fired	or	nuclear	power	stations),	
capturing	significant	amounts	of	energy	from	wind	and	fracking	for	unconventional	
fossil	fuels	involves	hundreds	(sometimes	thousands)	of	developments	spread	
throughout	an	area	or	territory	in	order	to	maximise	exploitation.
	
These	multiple	sites	of	
energy	development	clearly	increase	the	likelihood	of	multiple	sites	of	localised	
grievance,	particularly	in	relation	to	numerous	communities	faced	with	the	prospect	of	
‘hosting’	developments.
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However,	if	these	factors	help	explain	widespread	grassroots	
mobilisation	across	both	movements,	then	so	too	does	the	political	opportunity	
structure	faced	by	local	communities,	particularly	as	it	relates	to	planning.		
The	British	planning	regime	requires,	in	the	first	instance,	that	local	government	give	
planning	consent	for	fracking	and	(most)	wind	energy	projects	before	any	developments	
can	proceed.	Alhough	the	type	of	authority	deciding	on	planning	applications	varies	
according	to	the	technology	concerned	and		different	(devolved)	forms	of	national	
administration
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,	the	local	nature	of	decision-making	provides	opportunities	for	local	
citizens	to	influence	outcomes.	The	British	planning	system	is	noted	for	providing	
multiple	points	of	access	(e.g.	initial	consultation,	planning	committee	meetings,	public	
inquiries,	judicial	review)	for	citizens	to	voice	opinions	and	concerns	in	relation	to	
planning	applications,	and	decision-makers	are	legally	obliged	to	take	local	concerns	
into	account.	Anti-fracking	and	anti-windfarm	activists	are	acutely	aware	of	these	
avenues	for	redress,	and	see	them	as	a	realistic	means	of	resisting	locally	planned	
developments.	This	interpretation	of	the	local	political	opportunity	structure	informs	
the	motivational	frames	of	concerned	locals	and	provides	the	necessary	incentive	to	
mobilise	community	resources	towards	resisting	unpopular	proposals.	If	local	planning	
decisions	were	made	nationally,	we	might	see	far	fewer	local	campaign	groups	
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mobilising	against	planned	wind	energy	and	fracking	developments,	and	concomitantly,	
a	stronger	national	focus	to	both	movements.	The	combination	of	multiple	sites	of	
localised	grievance	deriving	from	geographically	diffuse	infrastructure,	and	an	open	
local	political	opportunity	structure	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	the	extent	of	
grassroots	mobilisation	in	both	cases.	
Having	provided	an	overview	of	both	movements	and	explained	their	predominantly	
grassroots	character,	it	remains	to	consider	other	aspects	of	these	movements.	The	
immediate	focus	here	will	be	on	grievances,	alliances	and	tactics,	before	moving	on	to	a	
discussion	of	developments	and	consequences.		
	
Grievances,	alliances,	tactics	
Though	the	diffuse	nature	of	both	types	of	infrastructure	helps	explain	the	multiple	sites	
of	grievance,	the	different	natures	of	the	two	technologies	help	us	understand	the	
content	of	the	objections	that	permeate	both	movements.	An	examination	of	the	
grievances	of	the	anti-fracking	and	anti-windfarm	movements	demonstrates	
considerable	differences	and	some	similarities	in	terms	of	the	concerns	expressed.	It	is	
notable	that	key	differences	in	these	grievances	have	had	an	impact	on	the	character	of	
alliance	formation	across	the	two	movements,	which	in	turn	has	shaped	tactical	
orientations.	
For	anti-windfarm	activists,	the	impact	on	the	landscape	is	typically	the	most	prominent	
grievance	(Haggett	2011),	with	windfarms	consistently	seen	as	an	industrialisation	of	
the	countryside	causing	great	damage	to	a	treasured	rural	aesthetic.	Other	prominent	
grievances	emphasise	the	human	health	impacts	of	noise	and	shadow-flicker	upon	those	
living	in	close	proximity	to	developments,	concerns	for	local	ecology,	and	impact	on	the	
value	of	local	heritage.	Worries	over	falling	property	prices	also	feature	highly	on	the	
agenda,	particularly	among	local	groups.	The	local	nature	of	many	grievances	has	left	
anti-windfarm	campaigners	open	to	the	charge	that	they	are	Nimbys:	self-interested	
local	organisations	with	little	concern	for	the	common	good.
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However,	critiques	of	
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policy	and	technology,	and	concern	for	the	landscape	in	general,	are	present	within	
protestors’	discourse,	thus	providing	evidence	of	framing	that	transcends	the	local.		
Though	the	anti-windfarm	movement	emphasises	a	number	of	environmental	concerns	
in	its	frames,	its	green	status	is	problematic	because	of	the	link	between	wind	energy	
and	climate	change	mitigation.	On	the	one	hand,	landscape	and	ecology	are	clearly	
environmental	issues;	on	the	other,	the	desire	to	fight	windfarms	can	be	seen	as	anti-
environmental	because	it	hinders	the	climate	change	cause.	This	tension	has	been	
characterised	as	a	‘green	on	green’	conflict	within	the	heart	of	the	broader	
environmental	movement	(Warren	et	al.	2005),	and	has	constrained	possible	alliances	
between	anti-windfarm	groups	and	environmental	organisations,	particularly	those,	
such	as	Greenpeace,	Friends	of	the	Earth	(FoE)	and	the	Green	Party,	that	place	climate	
change	near	the	top	of	their	agendas.	However,	this	lack	of	resonance	between	anti-
windfarm	campaigners’	and	the	discourse	of	climate	change	has	not	completely	
prevented	alliance	formation	between	them	and	green	groups.	Indeed,	“long-
established	landscape	protection	groups	such	as	the	Campaign	to	Protect	Rural	England	
(CPRE)	and	the	Campaign	for	the	Protection	of	Rural	Wales	(CPRW)	have	sometimes	
made	common	cause	with	anti-wind	protestors”	(Szarka	and	Bludhorn	2006:	31),	as	has	
the	Association	for	the	Protection	of	Rural	Scotland.	Other	groups	that	share	concerns	
over	the	deployment	of	windfarms	on	the	landscape	or	ecology	include	the	RSPB,	the	
Ramblers	Association,	the	Open	Spaces	Society	and	the	National	Trust.		
If	resonance	with	the	discourse	of	climate	change	has	proven	problematic	for	anti-
windfarm	activists,	that	has	not	been	the	case	for	the	anti-fracking	movement;	anti-
fracking	protestors	have	been	keen	to	emphasise	the	climate	change	impacts	of	
unconventional	energy	and	fracking,	both	in	terms	of	additional	CO2	emissions	from	the	
burning	of	unconventional	fossil	fuels
8
,	and	the	fugitive	emissions	(e.g.	methane)	
associated	with	the	extraction	of	some	resources	(e.g.	shale	gas	and	coal	bed	methane).	
In	addition	to	climate	change,	the	anti-fracking	movement	voices	a	number	of	other	
concerns	over	unconventional	energy	and	fracking.	These	include	contamination	of	
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groundwater,	local	air	pollution,	negative	impacts	on	the	landscape	and	human	health,	
seismic	events	caused	by	the	fracking	process,	and	concern	for	the	impact	of	fracking	
developments	on	house	prices.		
The	concern	about	climate	change	among	anti-fracking	campaigners	has	facilitated	their	
networking	with	a	different	coalition	of	groups	not	readily	available	to	the	anti-
windfarm	movement.
9
	Among	others,	these	include	established	environmental	groups	
such	as	the	Green	Party,	Greenpeace	and	FoE,	as	well	as	newer,	more	radical	groups	and	
networks	such	as	No	Dash	for	Gas	and	Reclaim	the	Power.	There	is	a	clear	contrast	
between	these	groups	and	the	more	conservative	landscape	protection	organisations	
that	ally	with	the	anti-windfarm	movement.	The	variable	alliances	that	have	formed	
have	had	direct	implications	for	the	tactics	employed	within	the	different	movements.	
However,	tactics	have	also	been	shaped	by	the	political	opportunity	structures	facing	
activists.	We	will	focus	on	the	latter	of	these	factors	first.		
As	already	outlined	above,	local	anti-fracking	and	anti-windfarm	activists	are	confronted	
with	an	open	planning	system	at	the	local	level,	which	provides	realistic	opportunities	
for	resisting	developments.	As	well	as	providing	an	incentive	to	mobilise	(see	above),	
the	open	nature	of	this	system	also	shapes	the	tactics	employed	by	local	protestors.	As	
noted	by	Rootes	(2006)	in	his	research	into	local	anti-incinerator	protest,	local	
protestors	adopt	a	twofold	tactical	approach	in	their	efforts	to	resist	locally	sited	
developments	through	the	planning	system.	This	approach	is	also	evident	across	the	
anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	movements.	On	the	one	hand,	protestors	seek	to	
present	rational	arguments	to	decision-makers	as	to	why	developments	should	not	go	
ahead;	on	the	other,	they	mobilise	local	organisations	(e.g.	environmental	groups	and	
parish	councils)	and	individuals	(citizens	and	notable	public	figures)	to	make	formal	
objections	to	the	proposals.	In	terms	of	rational	argumentation,	local	campaigners	seek	
to	exploit	the	institutional	openings	mentioned	earlier.	Here	there	is	a	general	
appreciation	that	planning	decisions	are	(ostensibly)	made	using	formal	criteria	
(national	policy,	development	plans,	planning	guidance	etc.)	relating	to	the	local	
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suitability	of	proposed	projects.	In	order	to	improve	their	chances,	anti-windfarm	and	
anti-fracking	campaigners	often	make	use	of	planning	consultants	and/or	others	with	
relevant	expertise	to	develop	arguments	that	speak	directly	to	these	criteria.		
In	terms	of	mobilisation,	campaigners	are	focused	on	communicating	the	idea	that	the	
weight	of	public	opinion	is	against	the	proposals.	This	is	particularly	relevant	at	the	local	
authority	level	where	decisions	are	made	by	elected	councillors.
10
	Working	on	the	basis	
of	the	‘logic	of	numbers’	(della	Porta	and	Diani	2006),	and	that	their	concern	about	their	
re-election	may	influence	the	planning	decisions	of	elected	councillors	(Rootes	2006;	
Toke	2005),	anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	activists	make	concerted	efforts	to	mobilise	
large	numbers	of	objections	against	proposed	developments.	The	impact	of	such	efforts	
will	be	considered	below.					
At	the	level	of	local	planning	there	are	clear	tactical	similarities	between	the	two	
movements.	However,	notable	differences	can	also	be	identified.	Among	these,	perhaps	
the	most	salient	is	the	greater	willingness	of	anti-fracking	protestors	to	adopt	
coordinated	non-violent	direct	action	(NVDA)	(marches,	demonstrations,	blockages,	
protest	camps,	etc.)	at	the	national	and	local	level.	With	the	exception	of	the	odd	small	
scale	national	and	local	demonstration,	non-violent	direct	action	is	less	a	feature	of	anti-
windfarm	activism.	As	will	become	clear	below,	the	organisational	alliances	formed	by	
the	two	movements	serve,	at	least	partially,	to	explain	this	difference.	
At	the	national	level,	there	are	numerous	examples	of	direct	action	against	
unconventional	energy	and	fracking.	Over	the	last	few	years	these	include:	a	number	of	
small-scale	demonstrations	in	London;	numerous	media-focused	publicity	stunts
11
;	and	
a	mass	lobby	of	Parliament	organised	by	a	coalition	of	grassroots	groups.	In	addition	to	
nationally	focused	direct	action,	the	starkest	example	of	non-violent	direct	action	at	the	
local	level	can	be	seen	in	the	use	of	protest	camps	outside	development	sites,	a	tactic	
that	has	been	deployed	on	at	least		nine	occasions	by	the	anti-fracking	movement,	
including,	most	notably,	at	Balcombe	in	West	Sussex	(see	below).			
Previous	research	has	highlighted	a	relationship	between	closed	political	opportunities	
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and	protesters’	use	of	more	radical	tactics	(Kitschelt	1986).	In	the	case	of	the	anti-
fracking	movement,	at	both	the	local	and	national	levels,	closed	opportunities	
structures	can	account	in	part	for	the	use	of	direct	action.	At	the	local	level,	for	example,	
the	political	opportunities	afforded	by	the	planning	regime	do	not	remain	open	
indefinitely.	Indeed,	when	developments	receive	planning	permission	and	become	
operational,	opportunities	for	objection	close,	and	it	is	at	such	points	that	protest	camps	
can	emerge.	At	the	national	level,	the	increasingly	strong	support	for	fracking	by	the	
government,	a	rejection	of	movement	concerns	when	opportunities	to	engage	are	
afforded
12
,	and	consistent	(though	at	times	qualified)	support	for	unconventional	
energy	across	the	main	political	parties	are	indicative	of	closed	national	opportunities,	
and	may	therefore	help	explain	the	use	of	non-violent	direct	action	(NVDA).	However,	
closed	political	opportunity	structures	are	not	sufficient	to	account	for	the	recourse	to	
NVDA.	Such	tactics	have	not	been	used	by	anti-windfarm	activists	who	have	faced	
similar	conditions,
13
	particularly	at	the	local	level.	How	then	can	we	understand	the	
reasons	for	this	variation?	
Reflecting	other	expressions	of	protest	against	unconventional	energy	around	the	world	
(Colvin	et	al.	2015;	Kuch	and	Titus	2014),	the	anti-fracking	movement	consists	of	a	
politically	variegated	network	of	groups	and	individuals	fighting	for	a	common	cause.	In	
the	UK,	these	range	from	traditional	middle-class	conservatives,	through	centre-left	
environmentalists,	to	radical	greens.	The	characteristics	of	this	network,	and	in	
particular	the	radical	green	element,	contrasts	with	the	predominantly	conservative	
bent	of	the	anti-windfarm	movement,	whose	activists	tend	to	be	older	and	
disconnected	from	environmental	activist	networks	(Gardner	2015).	This	may	help	to	
explain	variation	in	the	use	of	NVDA.		The	other	significant	explanatory	factor	here	is	the	
tried	and	tested	tactical	repertoires	adopted	by	some	groups.	These	two	elements	are	
not	unrelated.		
Though	the	idea	of	a	‘tactical	repertoire’	is	important	for	understanding	the	NVDA	
undertaken	by	established	groups	such	as	Greenpeace	(which	has	been	using	direct	
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action	media	stunts	in	its	campaigning	for	over	40	years)	the	influence	of	radical	political	
identity	and	tactical	repertoires	on	the	use	of	NVDA	can	most	readily	be	seen	among	
radical	green	groups	and	networks	such	as	Frack	Off,	Reclaim	the	Power	and	No	Dash	
for	Gas.	Each	of	these	groups	promotes	NVDA	as	a	legitimate	means	of	resistance,	has	
been	involved	in	direct	action	at	the	national	and	local	levels,	and	provides	advice	and	
training	on	the	use	of	NVDA	to	community	groups	and	others.	The	ideological	
orientation	of	these	groups,	past	experiences	of	protest,	and	concomitant	tactical	
repertoires	combine	to	facilitate	the	use	of	NVDA	against	fracking	infrastructure.	
Importantly	however,	there	is	a	strong	commitment	to	involve	local	campaign	groups	in	
such	activities.	For	instance,	Reclaim	the	Power	states	that	it	“is	a	grassroots	organising	
network	for	taking	direct	action	on	environmental,	economic	and	social	justice	issues,	
working	in	solidarity	with	affected	communities”	(No	Dash	for	Gas	2015).		
The	best-known	example	of	such	action	was	provided	by	the	Balcombe	protest	camps	in	
West	Sussex	in	the	summer	of	2013,	during	which	an	alliance	of	radical	green	groups,	
local	residents,	and	others	helped	sustain	two	months	of	direct	action	(marches	and	
blockades)	against	exploratory	drilling	by	Cuadrilla	Resources.	At	its	peak	the	protests	
involved	many	hundreds	of	people,	received	significant	coverage	in	the	national	media,	
saw	the	deployment	of	hundreds	of	police	and	the	arrest	of	125	people.	The	interaction	
between	predominantly	conservative	Balcombe	residents	(Mid	Sussex	District	Council	
2015)	and	radical	greens	helps	to	explain	the	involvement	of	the	former	in	activities	that	
their	political	identity	would	typically	preclude.
15
	Such	‘vegan’	(radical	greens)	and	
‘Volvo’	(middle-England	conservatives)	alliances	have	been	noted	in	other	instances	of	
active	protest	against	locally	sited	infrastructure	in	the	UK	(Griggs	and	Howarth	2002).
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So	far	we	have	seen	that	the	grassroots	structure	of	the	two	movements	has	been	
shaped	by	multiple	sites	of	localised	grievance	arising	from	the	deployment	of	
geographically	diffuse	infrastructures,	and	the	opportunities	afforded	by	an	open	
planning	system	at	the	local	level.	We	have	also	seen	that	different	grievances	shape	
alliances	across	both	movements,	which	in	turn	creates	variations	in	the	commitment	to	
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and	use	of	direct	action	tactics.	Having	described	and	explained	key	aspects	of	the	anti-
windfarm	and	anti-fracking	movements,	the	focus	will	now	shift	towards	consideration	
of	the	outcomes	and	consequences	of	those	movements,	and	policy	developments	that	
have	been	fashioned	in	response	to	the	challenges	they	pose.				
	
Developments,	outcomes,	consequences		
Perhaps	the	first	thing	to	note	in	relation	to	the	consequences	of	these	movements,	is	
that	neither	wind	nor	unconventional	energy	has	seen	major	policy	U-turns	in	the	face	
of	public	opposition:	onshore	wind	power	has	remained	central	to	successive	
governments’	renewable	and	low-carbon	energy	strategies;	and	the	government	
message	on	unconventional	energy	has,	if	anything,	grown	stronger	over	the	last	few	
years.	Thus	neither	movement	can	be	said	to	have	impacted	on	the	general	direction	of	
government	policy.	However,	though	central	government	policy	has	remained	on	
course,	there	has	been	a	greater	willingness	to	diverge	from	this	path	amongst	the	
devolved	administrations	in	the	UK,	most	notably	in	Scotland,
17
	whose	government,	in	
January	2015,	announced	a	moratorium	on	the	granting	of	planning	consents	for	
fracking	operations	pending	‘full	public	consultation’.	Though	the	impact	of	the	anti-
fracking	movement	on	this	decision	is	unclear,	the	issue	did,	in	the	context	of	a	
burgeoning	movement,	gain	a	high	profile	in	the	2014	independence	referendum.	
Friends	of	the	Earth	Scotland	claimed	the	announcement	amounted	to	a	“huge	victory	
for	the	communities,	individuals	and	groups	who	have	been	campaigning	to	stop	this	
dirty	industry”	(Brooks	2015).		
Beyond	the	decisions	of	national	governments,	the	place	where	the	anti-windfarm	and	
anti-fracking	movements	are	likely	to	have	the	greatest	impact	is	local	authority	
planning,	which	is	a	key	target	of	local	campaigns.	Of	the	two	policy	areas,	the	potential	
impact	of	local	activism	can	be	most	readily	seen	in	the	case	of	wind,	which	over	the	last	
25	years	has	seen	significantly	fluctuating	local	authority	approval	rates,	which	fell	as	
low	as	35%	in	late	2006.
18
	Clearly,	local	authority	planning	decisions	are	influenced	by	
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factors	other	than	community	campaigns	(Szarka	and	Blühdorn	2006,	31)
19
,	and	
applications	that	are	rejected	by	local	authorities	can	be	approved	later	at	public	
inquiries.	Nevertheless,	a	number	of	scholars	have	sought	to	understand	such	
developments	by	pointing	to	the	potential	impact	of	local	opposition	on	wind	energy	
planning	decisions	(Cowell	2007;	Szarka	and	Blühdorn	2006;	Loring	2007;	Toke	et	al.	
2008).	Here,	the	political	pressure	applied	to	elected	councillors	is	perhaps	the	main	
means	by	which	local	groups	can	influence	such	decisions	(Toke	2005;	Ogilvie	and	
Rootes	2015).			
Though	systematic	research	on	the	impact	of	anti-fracking	protest	in	the	UK	has	been	
limited,	there	are	some	signs	that	protest	against	unconventional	energy	might	be	
starting	to	achieve	results.	Indeed,	(anecdotal)	evidence	suggests	that	local	campaigns	
may	have	had	some	influence	on	recent	planning	decisions,	and	that	shifts	in	public	
attitudes	might	be	a	result	of	anti-fracking	mobilisation.	In	relation	to	the	former,	for	
instance,	after	“fierce	local	opposition”	to	Celtique	Energie’s	application	to	drill	near	
Wisborough	Green	in	2014,	West	Sussex	County	Council	rejected	the	bid	(Gosden	2014),	
while	in	2015	Lancashire	County	Council,	after	receiving	significant	local	objections,	
refused	to	give	Cuadrilla	Resources	planning	permission	for	seismic	testing	(BBC	2015).
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Attitudes	towards	shale	gas	among	the	general	public	were	increasingly	positive	in	a	
number	of	surveys	leading	up	to	the	summer	of	2013,	but,	after	the	well-publicised	
Balcombe	protests,	awareness	of	shale	gas	increased	and	positive	assessments	across	a	
number	of	measures	started	to	decline	(O’Hara	et	al.	2013).	O’Hara	et	al	speculate	that	
this	might	have	an	impact	on	the	strategy	adopted	by	the	movement,	particularly	if	‘the	
anti-fracking	lobby	come	to	believe	that	highly	visible	forms	of	protest	at	potential	sites	
for	hydraulic	fracturing	are	the	most	effective	means	of	changing	the	public	mood”	
(2013,	10).	However,	community	contention	over	fracking	developments	is	in	its	infancy	
when	compared	to	wind	energy
21
,	so	it	is	still	too	early	to	draw	direct	comparisons	
between	the	two	cases.	Nevertheless,	consideration	of	recent	government	and	industry	
initiatives	suggests	that	elite	political	and	economic	actors	view	both	movements	as	
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potential	impediments	to	the	implementation	of	their	policies.		
The	most	striking	similarity	in	elite	responses	can	be	found	in	government-sanctioned	
commitments	to	improve	community	engagement	practices,	and	to	provide	community	
benefit	packages	across	both	industries.	Though	such	practices	are	not	new	to	wind	
energy	planning
22
,	the	national	industry	body,	RenewableUK,	has	sought	to	formalise	
them	through	the	publication	of	Onshore	Wind:	Our	Community	Commitment	(2013),	a	
version	of	a	2011	publication	that	was	revised	in	the	light	of	a	government	consultation	
exercise	(RenewableUK	2011).	RenewableUK	is	promoting	a	voluntary	commitment	
among	its	members	to	meaningful	early	engagement	and	the	provision	of	community	
benefits	to	the	sum	of	£5,000/MW	per	year	generated	by	locally	sited	windfarms	
(RenewableUK	2013b)
23
.		Similarly,	United	Kingdom	Onshore	Oil	and	Gas	(UKOOG)	
published	its	Community	Engagement	Charter	in	2013	in	which	early	community	
engagement	and	community	benefits	are	key	features	of	the	Charter.	The	benefits	
offered	amount	to		“£100,000	per	well	site	where	hydraulic	fracturing	takes	
place...[and]	a	share	of	proceeds	at	production	stage	of	1%	of	revenues,	allocated	
approximately	2/3rd	to	the	local	community	and	1/3rd	at	the	county	level”	(UKOOG	
2013,	2).	Clearly	both	schemes	recognise	the	importance	of	such	practices	for	
promoting	community	acceptance,	and	aim	to	secure	adherence	among	their	members	
by	implementing	sanctions	for	non-compliance.	In	the	case	of	RenewableUK’s	
Commitment,	non-compliance	results	in	removal	from	the	scheme	(RenewableUK	2011,	
24),	while	‘failure	to	comply’	with	UKOOG’s	Charter	carries	the	heavier	penalty	of	“a	loss	
of	use	of	the	UKOOG	logo	and	ultimately	of	membership”	(UKOOG	2013,	1).		
Though	research	suggests	that	timely	engagement	and	the	offer	of	financial	stakes	in	
developments	can	improve	levels	of	community	acceptance	of	projects	(Soerensen	et	al.	
2001,	1;		Cass	2006,	33;	Loring	2007,	51-58),	it	is	too	early	to	tell	whether	these	
particular	measures	will	be	taken	up	across	the	respective	industries	and	whether,	if	
adopted,	they	will	have	the	desired	results.	Nevertheless,	attempts	to	formalise	these	
practices	by	government	and	industry	suggests	that	elite	actors	believe	that	they	can	
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produce	the	desired	outcome.	However,	it	is	worth	noting	here	that	community	benefits	
packages	are	often	perceived	as	bribes	by	local	objectors	(Aitken	2010;	Cass	et	al.	2010		
Walker	et	al.	2014,	51),	and	that	the	dissemination	of	such	views	by	local	campaigners	
may	have	the	potential	to	neutralise	the	attitudinal	changes	that	community	benefits	
strategies	try	to	realise.		
So	far	we	have	seen	a	number	of	similarities	and	differences	in	relation	to	policy	
developments,	outcomes	and	consequences	of	both	movements.	However,	before	
concluding,	it	is	worth	noting	one	final	difference	in	terms	of	curtailing	the	potential	
impact	of	opposition	to	government	policy.	This	point	focuses	on	the	issue	of	access	
rights	to	land.	Both	wind	energy	and	fracking	developers	require	access	to	land	to	carry	
out	their	operations,	which	often	involves	private	contracts	between	developers	and	
willing	landowners.	However,	whereas	windfarms	involve	infrastructure	that	is	fixed	in	
specific	locations,	fracking	operations	can	involve	underground	horizontal	drilling	
beyond	the	land	where	a	visible	development	is	situated.	This	raises	the	issue	of	access	
rights	to	drill	under	land	belonging	to	a	variety	of	people.	
Until	recently,	the	law	required	developers	to	gain	the	permission	of	property	owners	
under	whose	land	they	intend	to	drill,	while	drilling	without	gaining	this	permission	
constituted	trespass	(DECC	2014,	19-20).	Though	developers	could	apply	to	the	
Secretary	of	State	and	the	courts	should	permission	be	denied,	the	government	believed	
“existing	procedures	for	gaining	…	underground	access	[were]	costly,	time-consuming	
and	disproportionate”	(DECC	2014,	6).	As	a	result,	the	government	sought	to	change	the	
law	as	part	of	the	Infrastructure	Bill,	which	began	its	passage	through	Parliament	in	June	
2014	and	which	proposed	the	provision	of	“underground	access	to	gas,	oil	and	
geothermal	developers	below	300	metres”	(DECC	2014,	6).	The	Infrastructure	Act	
gained	Royal	Assent	on	12	February	2015	and	gave	developers	“the	right	to	use	deep-
level	land	to	exploit	petroleum	…	without	the	consent	of	the	owner”	(Hayhurst	2015)
24
.	
Vehemently	opposed	by	the	anti-fracking	movement,	the	Act	has	“removed	the	ability	
of	landowners	to	block	fracking	below	their	property”	(Carrington	2104),	thus	removing	
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an	obstacle	to	the	implementation	of	unconventional	energy	policy.		
We	have	noted	a	number	of	(potential)	consequences	of	the	anti-windfarm	and	anti-
fracking	movements	and	a	number	of	policy	developments	that	have	taken	place	in	the	
context	of	public	opposition	to	government	energy	policy.	Here	we	have	noted	that	
local	campaigns	are	likely	to	have	made	an	impact	on	wind	energy	planning	outcomes	
over	the	last	couple	of	decades,	and	that	anti-fracking	activism	might	be	similarly	
effective	in	this	area.	We	have	also	seen	that	the	wind	and	unconventional	fossil	fuels	
industries	have	secured	government-sponsored	initiatives	in	an	effort	to	achieve	
positive	planning	decisions.	There	are	however	differences	between	the	two	cases:	
efforts	to	secure	moratoriums	on	fracking	by	devolved	administrations,	and	significant	
statutory	changes	relating	to	underground	access	to	private	land,	meant	that	policy	
developments	in	unconventional	energy	are	set	apart	from	those	relating	to	wind	
energy	policy.		
	
Conclusion	
The	anti-windfarm	and	anti-fracking	movements	are	two	on-going	expressions	of	
mobilisation	against	different	strands	of	government	energy	policy.	Though	emerging	
some	twenty	years	apart,	both	movements	have	given	rise	to	significant	levels	of	
grassroots	activism	in	efforts	to	resist	locally	sited	developments,	and	both	are	
supported	by	a	number	of	active	nationally	focused	organisations.	As	we	have	seen,	the	
grassroots	structure	of	both	movements	is	shaped	by	the	geographically	diffuse	nature	
of	the	infrastructure	developments	associated	with	the	two	energy	technologies,	and	a	
political	opportunity	structure	that	offers	realistic	chances	of	resisting	developments	
through	an	open	planning	system,	as	a	result	of	which	it	appears	that	some	activists	may	
have	managed	to	obstruct	the	developments	they	oppose.		
As	well	as	differences	in	the	extent	and	patterns	of	institutionally	focused	activism,	a	
central	difference	between	the	two	movements	is	in	alliance	formation	and	the	use	of	
NVDA.	The	use	of	such	tactics	in	the	anti-fracking	movement	was	influenced	by	the	
 17 
presence	in	that	movement	of	network	links	with	radical	organisations	whose	activists	
subscribed	to	the	use	of	NVDA.	In	contrast,	any	possibility	of	such	alliances	in	the	anti-
windfarm	movement	was	precluded	by	inherent	tensions	between	the	assumptions	and	
discourses	of	the	opponents	of	windfarms	and	those	of	environmental	radicals.	The	
anti-wind	movement	includes	prominent	activists	who	are	sceptical	about	the	threat	of	
climate	change	and,	especially,	about	claims	that	that	threat	is	so	great	and	urgent	that	
renewable	energy	must	be	deployed	even	at	the	expense	of	intruding	upon	rural	
landscapes;	radical	environmental	groups,	on	the	other	hand,	start	from	the	assumption	
that	the	urgency	of	climate	change	mitigation	trumps	considerations	of	landscape	
aesthetics.	The	shift	in	public	attitudes	after	the	Balcombe	protest	provides	some	
evidence	of	the	impact	of	widely	reported	direct	action	by	anti-fracking	protestors.		
Finally,	numerous	(policy)	developments	have	been	noted,	including	moratoriums	on	
fracking	by	devolved	administrations	in	Scotland	and	Wales,	initiatives	to	improve	
community	acceptance	of	locally	sited	developments	across	both	industries,	and	
changes	to	the	law	that	give	exploration	companies	deep-level	access	under	privately	
owned	land	to	facilitate	exploration	for	and	exploitation	of	unconventional	sources	of	
energy.	Each	of	these	developments	has	occurred	since	2013.	Contention	over	UK	
energy	policy	continues,	and	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	it	will	become	less	intense	
in	coming	years.			
	
	
Notes	
1.	For	example,	the	current	tax	rate	for	onshore	shale	gas	production	is	30%,	which	compares	
with	a	62%	rate	on	new	North	Sea	oil	operations	(Macalister	and	Harvey	2013).	
2.	Fracking	“is	a	process	that	injects	a	large	amount	of	fluids	(water	with	chemicals	and	sand)	at	
high	pressures	into	rock	formations	to	fracture	them,	enabling	compounds	such	as	gas	that	are	
held	tightly	inside	to	be	released”	(UNEP	2012,	2).			
3.	‘Extreme	energy’	is	the	term	deployed	by	activists	for	unconventional	energy.		
4.	By	its	very	nature	wind	is	a	diffuse	resource	that	blows	widely	across	a	territory.	Different	
types	of	unconventional	energy	(e.g.	shale	gas	and	oil,	and	coal	seam	gas)	are	also	diffuse,	
widely	permeating	and	‘tightly	held’	within	particular	strata	of	rock.		
5.	The	term	‘site’	here	refers	to	the	(proposed)	physical	development	of	infrastructure	in	a	
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particular	location	in	relation	to	which	grievances	and	mobilisation	can	develop.		
6.	In	England,	wind	energy	developments	under	50MWs	are	mainly	decided	by	district	councils,	
whereas	county	councils	are	predominantly	responsible	for	decisions	over	onshore	oil	and	gas	
developments.	In	Scotland	and	Wales	both	types	of	planning	decisions	are	made	by	unitary	
councils,	which	combine	the	functions	performed	by	district	and	county	councils	in	most	of	
England.		
7.	Nimby	is	an	acronym	meaning	‘not	in	my	backyard’.		
8.	In	addition	to	conventional	fossil	fuels.	
9.	Many	of	the	additional	grievances	just	identified	are	also	a	concern	of	these	groups.	
	10.	This	approach	is	less	relevant	at	planning	inquiries	and	judicial	reviews	where	unelected	
planning	inspectors	and	judges	respectively	make	decisions.		
11.		Among	others,	these	have	included	mock-fracking	George	Osborne’s	constituency	offices	
and	David	Cameron’s	Cotswold	cottage	by	Greenpeace,	Reclaim	the	Power	activists	supergluing	
themselves	to	the	doors	of	DEFRA,	and	the	construction	of	a	model	fracking	rig	outside	
Parliament	by	the	Campaign	against	Climate	Change.	
12.		DECC	received	40,647	responses	to	its	public	consultation	on	Underground	Drilling	Access,	a	
proposed	policy	that	would	give	developers	a	right	to	drill	under	people’s	property	(see	below).	
99%	of	respondents	objected	to	this	proposal,	yet	the	government	concluded:	“[w]hilst	a	wide	
range	of	arguments	were	raised	and	points	covered,	we	did	not	identify	any	issues	that	
persuaded	us	to	change	the	basic	form	of	the	proposals”	(DECC	2014).	
13.	At	the	national	level	the	Labour	government	had	limited	time	for	anti-windfarm	movement	
during	the	2000s.	However,	the	current	Conservative	administration	has	proven	more	
sympathetic.		
14.	Cuadrilla’s	plans	were	to	drill	“a	conventional	oil	well”,	and	not	‘frack’	for	shale	gas,	though	
fracking	for	oil	had	not	been	ruled	out	at	a	later	date	(O’Hara	et	al.	2013,	2).	
15.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	roles	of	local	residents	did	vary	during	the	protests,	from	
logistical	support	to	more	active	involvement	in	NVDA.		
16.	Griggs	and	Howarth	(2002)	point	out	the	local	residents	are	typically	motivated	by	
instrumental	reasoning,	while	radical	greens	are	ideologically	motivated		
17.	The	Welsh	assembly	also	recently	voted	to	ban	fracking	in	Wales,	though	it	is	as	yet	unclear	
whether	it	has	the	power	to	impose	such	a	ban	(The	Ecologist	2015;	Dafydd	2015).	
18.	In	the	early-1990s	roughly	two-thirds	of	applications	were	approved	in	the	UK,	but	by	the	
end	of	the	decade	‘nearly	70%	failed	to	get	planning	permission’	(Elliot	2003,	232).	Between	
2003	and	late-2006	approval	rates	fell	from	around	65%	to	35%	(RenewableUK	2007).	In	2007/8	
approval	rates	rose	to	80%,	but	then	fell	to	54%	in	2010/11	(RenewableUK	2011).		
19.	Not	least	the	recommendations	of	planning	officers	and	the	views	of	statutory	consultees.	
20.	The	latter	case	is	particularly	notable	given	‘planning	officers,	the	Health	and	Safety	
Executive	and	the	Environment	Agency	recommended	approval’	(BBC	2015).	
21.	Many	planning	decisions	for	unconventional	energy	have	yet	to	be	made,	and	many	more	
applications	are	likely	to	be	submitted	over	the	coming	years,	particularly	after	the	results	are	
announced	of	the	recent	14
th
	onshore	Oil	and	Gas	Licensing	Round	(the	consultation	process	
closed	on	29	September	2015).		
22.		There	is	a	history	of	early	engagement	and	the	provision	of	community	benefits	among	
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some	wind	energy	developers,	though	these	practices	have	not	been	consistently	applied	across	
the	industry.			
	22.These	plans	mainly	apply	to	wind	energy	developments	in	England.	Similar	plans	have	
developed	in	other	parts	of	the	UK	(see	Scottish	Renewables	2015;	Windpower	Wales	no	date;	
RenewableUK	2013a).		
24.	This	part	of	the	Act	does	not	apply	to	Scotland.	
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